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Bence Nanay 
Aesthetic Attention 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to give a new account of the way we 
exercise our attention in some paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experi-
ence. I treat aesthetic experience as a specific kind of experience and, 
like in the case of other kinds of experiences, attention plays an 
important role in determining its phenomenal character. I argue that 
an important feature of at least some of our aesthetic experiences is 
that we exercise our attention in a specific, distributed, manner: our 
attention is focused on one perceptual object, but it is distributed 
among the various properties of this object. I argue that this way of 
exercising one’s attention is very different from the way we attend 
most of the time and it fits very well with some important features of 
paradigmatic examples of aesthetic experience. 
I. Introduction 
This paper does not aim to give a general account of aesthetic experi-
ence. I don’t think that there is one and only one kind of aesthetic 
experience; that it is a monolithic category. My suspicion is that we 
tend to call any strong (or intense, or emotionally significant) experi-
ence that we have in an aesthetic context ‘aesthetic experience’. But 
this can mean very different things: experiences of overwhelming 
beauty, experiences of strong emotions, experiences of strong identi-
fication with a fictional character, musical frissons, and so on. 
The aim of this paper is much more limited — I want to single out 
an important aspect of some paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experi-
ence: the way we exercise our attention. This is not a particularly new 
angle — an old and influential, broadly Kantian, way of thinking 
about aesthetic experiences aims to understand what is special about 
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aesthetic experiences in terms of disinterested or aesthetic attention. 
But the notion of disinterested attention (as the notion of aesthetic 
experience itself) has acquired a terrible reputation in the last few 
decades. The aim of this paper is to give a new account of how this 
‘special’ kind of disinterested or aesthetic attention could be cashed 
out with the help of the conceptual apparatus of perceptual 
psychology. 
The gist of this account is that, in the case of some paradigmatic 
cases of aesthetic experience, we attend in a distributed and at the 
same time focused manner: our attention is focused on one perceptual 
object but it is distributed among a large number of this object’s 
properties. This way of attending contrasts sharply with the most 
standard way of exercising our attention (which would be focusing on 
a limited set of properties of one or more perceptual objects). In other 
words, this way of attending is special and I argue that it is a central 
feature of some paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience. And this 
approach explains a number of puzzling features of these paradigmatic 
cases of aesthetic experience and also captures the distinctive features 
of the way artists, novelists, and philosophers described their aesthetic 
experiences. 
We know from perceptual psychology that attention can bring about 
radical changes in our perceptual experience. As inattentional blind-
ness experiments show (see Simmons and Chabris, 1999; Mack and 
Rock, 1998), when we are not attending to a stimulus (because our 
attentional resources are used up for another task), we tend not to be 
aware of stimuli even if they take up a large part of the visual field. 
An example: you see a clip where people pass a basketball around. 
You are supposed to count how many times the team whose members 
are dressed in white pass the ball among themselves. Most participants 
who do this fail to notice that a man in a gorilla costume walks across 
the screen and takes up a significant part of the screen for a long 
period of time (Simmons and Chabris, 1999). Subjects are not aware 
of the gorilla, because their attention is directed elsewhere (to the 
passing of the basketball). If there is no counting task to perform, 
everyone immediately notices the gorilla. There is a debate about 
whether we really fail to see the gorilla or maybe we were conscious 
of the gorilla, but we immediately forgot it: whether we should talk 
about inattentional blindness or inattentional amnesia (see Wolfe, 
1999). But regardless of which way we go, it remains true that 
different ways of attending influence our experience radically. But if 
we treat aesthetic experience as a kind of experience, then it should 
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also be true that the way we are attending is a crucial feature of 
aesthetic experiences. And I argue that if we take the attention we 
exercise in some paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience to be 
aesthetic attention (where our attention is distributed among a large 
number of a single object’s properties), we can understand some 
important features of aesthetic experience. 
II. Varieties of Aesthetic Experience 
I doubt that there is one kind of aesthetic experience: there are many, 
very different kinds of experiences that we tend to call aesthetic. The 
kind of aesthetic experience I will focus on is only one of these, but 
one that has been very influential in art, literature, and philosophy. 
Here is someone who can describe experiences of this kind better than 
I can: 
But even the ugliness of faces, which of course were mostly familiar to 
him, seemed something new and uncanny, now that their features, — 
instead of being to him symbols of practical utility in the identification 
of this or that man, who until then had represented merely so many 
pleasures to be sought after, boredoms to be avoided, or courtesies to be 
acknowledged — were at rest, measurable by aesthetic coordinates 
alone, in the autonomy of their curves and angles. (Proust, 1928, 
Swann’s Way, pp. 469–70) 
A lot is going on in this quote. We have the (broadly Kantian) insight 
that this experience is devoid of practical utility. We also have a 
formalist spin with the emphasis on curves and angles. And also the 
seeing of something familiar in a new light, with fresh eyes. All of 
these themes are important and influential features of one particular 
kind of aesthetic experience — again, not all experiences in an 
aesthetic context. And the aim of this paper is to understand better 
how our mind works when we have an aesthetic experience of this 
kind. 
I singled out the quote from Proust because he somehow managed 
to condense three important themes of what it is to have an aesthetic 
experience into one sentence. But one may still worry how ‘para-
digmatic’ these instances of aesthetic experiences are. All right, Proust 
had them, but this surely doesn’t make them paradigmatic. Indeed it 
wouldn’t, but there are many, many artists, writers, and philosophers 
who talk about the same kind of experience: this is exactly what 
Robert Musil meant by the ‘Other Condition’ (see Nanay, 2014), what 
Julio Cortázar meant by paravision (in Hopscotch), what John 
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Szarkowski called the ‘abandonment to the uncomplicated pleasure of 
seeing’ (Szarkowski, 1964, p. 9), and what Jonas Mekas tried to cap-
ture in his films and, to throw in a really obscure reference, what Géza 
Ottlik described as ‘the freedom of perception’ in his 1957 novel, 
Iskola a határon — the list could go on indefinitely (and I will give 
some further quotes at the end of the paper), but let me add two more 
evocative examples. Here is Albert Camus: 
In the cloisters of San Francisco in Fiesole, a little courtyard with 
arcades. Red flowers, sunshine and yellow and black bees. In a corner, a 
green watering can. Flies humming everywhere. In the warmth, the little 
garden breathes gently… I want nothing else but this detachment and 
this closed space — this lucid and patient intensity.1 
And the last example is from Aldous Huxley’s book The Doors of 
Perception, where he makes a systematic attempt at describing his 
drug-induced experiences, which he takes to be an intensified version 
of the aesthetic experiences I want to focus on here. 
A small typing table stood in the center of the room; beyond it, from my 
point of view, was a wicker chair and beyond that a desk. The three 
pieces formed an intricate pattern of horizontals, uprights and diagonals 
— a pattern all the more interesting for not being interpreted in terms of 
spatial relationships. Table, chair and desk came together in a compo-
sition… I was looking at my furniture, not as the utilitarian who has to 
sit on chairs, to write at desks and tables, and not as the cameraman or 
scientific recorder, but as the pure aesthete whose concern is only with 
forms and their relationships within the field of vision or the picture 
space. (Huxley, 1954, pp. 21–2) 
While these authors put their fingers on some important features of 
these paradigmatic examples of aesthetic experience, there are other 
important features. Robert Hopkins makes a distinction between 
judging beauty and savouring beauty (Hopkins, 1997, pp. 181–2; see 
also Scheffler, 2010, for a similar distinction). He points out that 
judging something to be beautiful is not a very demanding notion at 
all — it merely means forming a belief that it is beautiful. Savouring 
beauty, on the other hand, ‘implies responding to it in a more full-
blooded way’ (Hopkins, 1997, p. 181). In the case of savouring 
beauty, our ‘sensibilities are engaged by that beauty’ (ibid.). It is 
possible to judge things to be beautiful without savouring their beauty. 
This was, allegedly, the way in which Ernst Gombrich experienced 
                                                          
1  Albert Camus: Carnets, 1937, September 15. 
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artworks in the last couple of decades of his life: he saw that a paint-
ing was beautiful or graceful but it left him completely cold. But this 
would not constitute an aesthetic experience, at least not in the sense I 
am interested in here. What is also needed is that our ‘sensibilities are 
engaged’ and that the experience is more ‘full-blooded’. 
The reason why I used the Proust quote and the Hopkins distinction 
is not in order to give a precise definition of the kind of aesthetic 
experiences I want to focus on, but rather to help the reader recognize 
these paradigmatic examples of aesthetic experiences. I am assuming 
that experiences of this kind are something the reader is familiar with. 
Maybe you call it something else, but it is very likely that you have 
had experiences of this kind. But it is possible that you have no idea 
what I am (or Proust is) talking about, nor are you interested in some 
complicated description of a fleeting impression you have no reason to 
care about. This is not a reason to stop reading this paper. My aim is 
to use a very specific way of attending to characterize an interesting 
variety of experience. So you should not stop reading this paper if you 
are interested in attention or experiences or the relation between the 
two. 
One tempting way of approximating what all these authors were 
talking about is something like an experience of overwhelming beauty 
(and this is the route Hopkins follows). But this is not a particularly 
helpful characterization as aesthetic experiences are not always and 
not necessarily overwhelming — they can be fleeting moments of 
beauty. More importantly, this characterization seems to tie the con-
cept of aesthetic experience to the concept of beauty, but this does not 
exactly take us into crystal clear territory — it’s not as if we have firm 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being beautiful. 
Further, besides the general worry about the lack of clarity when it 
comes to the concept of beauty, an additional problem is that I am not 
even sure that all aesthetic experiences are experiences of beauty. The 
experience Proust talks about, for example, doesn’t seem to be about 
beauty at all. But this way of thinking about aesthetic experiences may 
still help the reader to recall some of her own aesthetic experiences. 
There is great variation between different people’s aesthetic experi-
ences of this kind. Richard Wollheim famously spent an average of 
two hours looking at a painting in order to arrive at an ‘aesthetic judg-
ment’ of it and argued that the first glance impression is often mis-
leading when it comes to assessing the aesthetic value of a painting 
(Wollheim, 1987, p. 8). I had the chance to observe him during this 
process and he insisted that it takes him at least an hour in front of a 
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picture to have anything reminiscent of an aesthetic experience (he 
used the term between air-quotes). Contrast this with Clement 
Greenberg (see Danto, 1996, p. 109; Hoving, 1993, p. 256), who took 
aesthetic experience to be instantaneous: he was known for making his 
assessment about the aesthetic value of a painting on the basis of 
whether he had an aesthetic experience in the very first split second of 
seeing it. 
I talked about some important features of some paradigmatic cases 
of aesthetic experience — following Proust’s insights. But there are 
two further features that I take to be very important: (a) we do not 
have complete control over them, and (b) they have a lingering effect. 
It has happened to many of us that although we have entered a 
museum with the specific intention of having an aesthetic experience 
of a specific artwork, it just didn’t happen. We stand in front of it and 
we fail to experience it in an aesthetic manner, in spite of the fact that 
we really want to. Maybe we are too fixated on the lecture we need to 
give in half an hour. Or maybe we are still thinking of the conversa-
tion we had over lunch with a friend. Or maybe we are just too sleepy. 
In any case, the aesthetic experience is just not forthcoming. In this 
respect, aesthetic experiences are very different from the ordinary 
perceptual experiences of, say, colour or shape. If I am looking at an 
object and want to see its colour, this will guarantee, barring some odd 
circumstances, that I experience its colour. This is apparently not so 
when it comes to aesthetic experiences. I do not take this crucial 
aspect of aesthetic experiences to be controversial — many artists and 
art critics expressed their frustration about it — my favourite quote on 
this comes from Roger Fry: 
There are days of lowered vitality when one may wander disconsolately 
in a gallery like the Louvre, in despair at one's incapacity to respond to 
the appeal of the great masters, whom one had thought to be one’s 
friends, but who suddenly seem to speak an alien tongue. (Fry, 1927/ 
1951, p. 40) 
Here is another observation that I take to be an uncontroversial feature 
of aesthetic experiences and that is also surprisingly missing from the 
philosophical discussion of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experi-
ences tend to have a lingering effect. They often do not stop when the 
contemplation of the object of the aesthetic experience stops. After 
leaving the concert hall or the cinema, one may still see the world 
differently. Whether this ‘lingering effect’ is better described as the 
continuation of our aesthetic experience or as the aesthetic experience 
colouring and altering the ensuing experience depends on how one 
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individuates experiences in general. But the main point is that, after 
having spent a day in the museum, our experience of the banal scenes 
on leaving the museum tends to retain some kind of aesthetic 
character (it is important that this doesn’t happen all the time — 
something often distracts us — but tends to happen nonetheless). 
Jean-Marie Straub and Danielle Huillet’s film Une visite au Louvre 
(2004) emphasizes this odd feature of aesthetic experiences, when 
they follow up 45 minutes of footage of brilliantly filmed artworks 
with a scene of the poplar tree outside of the Louvre. Our aesthetic 
experience of the tree outside is as strong as that of the paintings 
inside. 
Finally, I need to acknowledge that the concept of aesthetic experi-
ence has acquired a terrible reputation in the last couple of decades. 
And I should make it clear that we can nonetheless use this concept in 
a relatively harmless manner and that we do not need to side with any 
highly controversial claims that made this concept acquire this 
reputation. 
First, the concept of aesthetic experience has been used to define art. 
The idea is that those objects are works of art that are supposed to 
trigger aesthetic experiences or, alternatively, that trigger aesthetic 
experiences in a suitably informed spectator (see Bell, 1914, for a 
classic exposition). With some alternative definitions of art (see 
Dickie, 1964, and Levinson, 1979) as well as the general scepticism 
about the feasibility and desirability of a general definition of art (see, 
for example, Weitz, 1956; Lopes, 2008; 2014), this use of the concept 
of aesthetic experience is not something anyone who still talks about 
aesthetic experiences should feel obliged to take seriously. 
Second, the concept of aesthetic experience has also often been 
taken to be the holy grail of how we should enjoy (great) art: if we 
enjoy (great) art the right way, we experience the work of art in an 
aesthetic manner. What seems to follow from this is that if we do not 
have an aesthetic experience when looking at (great) works of art, we 
are not doing what we are supposed to be doing: maybe we lack 
aesthetic sensibility or concentration or training. I will not assume that 
there is a right way of engaging with art, let alone that the right way is 
to have an aesthetic experience. 
Third, I take aesthetic experience to be neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the experience of works of art. We can experience works 
of art in a non-aesthetic manner and we can experience objects other 
than works of art in an aesthetic manner. We experience works of art 
in all kinds of ways: sometimes we are only paying attention to their 
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price or to their colour (as in the proverbial case of buying an artwork 
to match one’s sofa). These experiences are unlikely to be aesthetic 
experiences. Yet, what we experience in these examples are works of 
art. Also, presumably art thieves don’t have aesthetic experience when 
they are robbing a museum. Conversely, we can have aesthetic experi-
ence of nature and of ordinary objects (see Carroll, 1993, and Irvin, 
2008, respectively). In short, the concept of aesthetic experience 
should be detached from art: some, but not all, of our aesthetic experi-
ences are of artworks and some, but not all, our experiences of art-
works are aesthetic experiences. 
Fourth, I don’t want to restrict aesthetic experiences to perceptual 
experiences (although I will mainly talk about perceptual aesthetic 
experiences in this paper). It has been argued that we can have 
aesthetic experiences of entities that are not perceived: maybe ideas 
(in the case of engaging with conceptual art), maybe large scale narra-
tive structure (Collingwood, 1938; Goldie and Schellekens, 2007; 
Shelley, 2003; Costello, 2013). I see no reason why we should exclude 
these from the circle of aesthetic experiences. 
My aim is to explain some important features of some paradigmatic 
cases of aesthetic experience in terms of aesthetic attention. And if 
this explanatory scheme works, it should also work in the case of 
these non-perceptual examples of aesthetic experience. 
III. Disinterested Attention 
Probably the oldest and most widely discussed account of aesthetic 
experience focuses on the phenomenal character of these experiences. 
The general idea is that, to put it simply, aesthetic experiences ‘feel’ 
different: what it is like to have aesthetic experiences is different from 
what it is like to have non-aesthetic experiences. The question then is: 
what is this phenomenal character that is proprietary to aesthetic 
experiences? Some of the most famous candidates are detachment, 
disinterestedness, and disengagement (Stolnitz, 1960, emphasizes 
disinterestedness, whereas Bullough, 1912, emphasizes emotional 
detachment) — and these are very much in the spirit of the Proust 
quote I started out with. The general Kantian insight here is that our 
aesthetic experiences are different from our other experiences in as 
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much as they are free from our everyday worries and practical 
outlook.2 
The concept of attention has been very important both in the exposi-
tions of and in the objections to the ‘disinterestedness’ accounts of 
aesthetic experience. Eliseo Vivas, for example, defines aesthetic 
experience as ‘an experience of rapt attention which involves the 
intransitive apprehension of an object’s immanent meanings and 
values in their full presentational immediacy’ (Vivas, 1959, p. 227). 
Jerome Stolnitz also appeals to the concept of attention in his defi-
nition of the aesthetic attitude as ‘disinterested and sympathetic 
attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, 
for its own sake alone’ (Stolnitz, 1960, pp. 33–4; see also Fenner, 
1996; Kemp, 1999). 
I will follow the same route: I also think that a crucial feature of 
some paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience is the way our 
attention is exercised and this way has a lot to do with disinterested-
ness (at least under some conception of disinterestedness). But it has 
to be acknowledged that talking about aesthetic attention and 
especially disinterested aesthetic attention has become a strict taboo in 
aesthetics since George Dickie’s influential rejection of the very idea 
of aesthetic attitude and aesthetic experience, which is based on a 
lengthy analysis of the concept of ‘disinterested attention’ (Dickie, 
1964; 1974; see also Zemach, 1997). If we want to revive the concept 
of aesthetic attention, it needs to be pointed out that Dickie’s argument 
is incomplete or maybe even misguided. And, as it turns out, it is. 
Dickie (reasonably) assumes that those accounts that define 
aesthetic experience (or aesthetic attitude) in terms of disinterested 
attention would need to have a clear distinction between interested and 
disinterested attention: aesthetic experience is characterized by dis-
interested attention and other kinds of experiences are characterized 
by interested attention. But, so the argument continues, attention is 
just not the kind of thing that can be interested or disinterested. 
As Dickie’s supposed demolition of the myth of the aesthetic atti-
tude seems to rely on this piece of conceptual analysis of attention, we 
need to examine the assumptions he makes about this concept. The 
most important assumption seems to be that there is one kind of 
                                                          
2  I called this insight Kantian because this is a view routinely attributed to Kant, but see 
Zangwill (1992) for a more nuanced account of what Kant meant and for an analysis of 
how contemporary concepts of disinterestedness relate to the Kantian one. 
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attention: attention can have different motives and it can be stronger 
or weaker but we cannot talk about different types of attention.3 For 
Dickie, there is only one type of attention.4 
But this is just a false claim. There are a number of ways of attend-
ing (overt/covert, endogenous/exogenous, focused/distributed, etc. — 
see Chun, Golomb and Turk-Browne, 2011, for a taxonomy, and see 
also Posner, 1980; 1984; Posner et al., 1984; Hoffman and 
Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler et al., 1995, for the specific distinctions). 
But if this is so, then we can bypass Dickie’s argument and try to 
characterize aesthetic experiences in terms of the way our attention is 
being exercised. This is exactly what I aim to do — by turning to 
philosophy of perception for some help. 
IV. Distributed versus Focused Attention 
My starting point is the old and, within perceptual psychology, main-
stream distinction between focused and distributed attention. Here is a 
brief exposition of this distinction: 
When the attention of an observer is strictly or intensely focussed on a 
particular part of a visual scene… then only its object(s) are present in 
consciousness, but in most ordinary viewing situations attention is not 
so exclusively focussed. Rather, it tends to be far more broadly distri-
buted, encompassing much of what is present in the scene. (Mack, 
2002, p. 105) 
The distinction between focused and distributed attention is not new: 
it was introduced in the early 1970s (Eriksen and Hoffman, 1972) and 
was routinely used in describing visual search experiments soon after-
wards (see, for example, Treisman and Elade, 1980). It has been a 
standard distinction in the visual search and visual attention literature 
ever since (the same distinction is often referred to as focal versus 
diffuse attention; see, for example, Cavanagh and Alvarez, 2005; 
Chong and Treisman, 2005).5 
                                                          
3  ‘There is only one way to listen to (to attend to) music, although listening may be more 
or less attentive and there may be a variety of motives, intentions and reasons for doing 
so and a variety of ways of being distracted from the music’ (Dickie, 1964, p. 58). 
4  Dickie does admit that we can attend to different properties of the same entity, but 
maintains that there is only one way of attending to a property. 
5  This distinction is not the same as the widely discussed foreground/background 
distinction, that is, the distinction between awareness of the attended stimulus and 
awareness without (or with little) attention (see, for example, Neisser’s, 1967, concept 
of pre-attentive processing; Rock and Gutman’s, 1981, concept of inattention; see also 
 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
13
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 106 B.  NANAY 
It is important to emphasize that the difference between focused and 
distributed attention concerns the size of the visual field or the number 
of objects one is attending to. To this empirically established dis-
tinction between focused and distributed attention I would like to add 
a conceptual one about what it is that we are attending to: to entities or 
to properties (see Scholl, 2001). We sometimes talk about attending to 
entities: to the pedestrian who is crossing the road in front of me or to 
the car that is trying to overtake me (James, 1892/1961, p. 39). But 
sometimes we talk about attending to properties: to the colour of the 
car that is trying to overtake me or to its speed, etc. Every entity has 
lots of properties. Hence, we can shift our attention from one property 
to another while still attending to the same object — say, when I 
attend to the colour of my laptop and then I start attending to its 
shape.6 
The traditional distinction between focused vs. distributed attention 
we know from vision science is a distinction between two ways of 
attending to entities. But we can make a similar distinction between 
attending to properties in a focused or distributed manner. Suppose 
that I am attending to one object only (say, because there is only one 
object in my visual field). I can attend to only a few properties (or 
even only one property) of this object. But my attention can also be, to 
paraphrase Mack, ‘broadly distributed, encompassing’ various prop-
erties I perceive the object as having. The same distinction can be 
made if I am attending to a number of objects. I can attribute the same 
property — say, the property of being red — to all of these objects 
(this is in fact what happens during visual search experiments). In this 
case, although my attention is distributed in the sense that I am 
attending to a number of objects, my attention is focused inasmuch as 
I attribute only a few properties to them. But I can also attribute 
different properties to different objects, in which case both my 
attention to objects and my attention to properties are distributed. 
                                                                                                                  
Mangan, 1993; Schwitzgebel, 2007, for philosophical summaries). When our attention 
is focused, we may still be aware of some stimuli that are not attended to (in fact, in the 
Neisser and Rock experiments attention seems to be focused). And the same is true of 
distributed attention. The contrast between focused and distributed attention is about 
how much of the visual stimuli we are attending to and not how much of it we are con-
scious of. 
6  I need to emphasize that what I mean by attention is conscious attention. This is not to 
deny (or endorse) that attention can be unconscious, but it is conscious distributed 
attention that I take to be an important feature of the aesthetic domain. 
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Thus, we get two cross-cutting distinctions: focused versus distri-
buted attention with regards to objects, and focused versus distributed 
attention with regards to properties. I am interested in experiences 
where our attention is distributed with regards to properties but 
focused with regards to objects. I call attention of this kind ‘aesthetic 
attention’ and argue that it is a crucial feature of some paradigmatic 
examples of aesthetic experience. 
Most of the time, we are attending to only a few properties of any 
object in our visual field. As Mack emphasizes above, our attention is 
normally distributed (with regards to objects): we are attending to a 
number of objects. But then given the limited capacity of our 
attention, we are unlikely to attribute a large number of different 
properties to them (see Wolfe, Klempen and Dahlen, 2000). Thus, 
attending to one object only but to a large number of different 
properties thereof is special — it is a very different way of allocating 
our limited processing resources from the standard case: it is allocated 
to one object only, but to a variety of its properties (and not to lots of 
objects and a limited number of their properties). And it is this 
‘special’ way of attending that I call ‘aesthetic attention’.7 
More slowly: the two cross-cutting distinctions (between focused 
versus distributed attention with regards to objects and between 
focused versus distributed attention with regards to properties) give us 
four different ways in which we can exercise our attention. Our 
attention can be: 
(i) Distributed with regards to objects and focused with regards to 
properties, 
(ii) Distributed with regards to objects and distributed with regards 
to properties, 
(iii) Focused with regards to objects and focused with regards to 
properties, 
(iv) Focused with regards to objects and distributed with regards to 
properties. 
                                                          
7  It is important to emphasize that the limitation of attentional resources applies in the 
case of distributed attention the same way as it does to focused attention. But while 
focused attention concentrates these resources to a limited number of properties, distri-
buted attention doesn’t. Attending to many properties of one object and attending to one 
property of many objects are equally demanding in terms of attentional resources, but it 
utilizes these resources very differently. 
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An example of (i) is the way we exercise our attention in visual search 
experiments or in tasks where we need to sort through a pile of red 
and blue socks. In these cases, we are attending to lots of objects, but 
only to one property of these objects (in this example, their colour). In 
the case of (ii) our attention is all over the place: it is not fixated either 
on an object or on any given property: it wanders aimlessly. I take this 
to be a fairly common way of attending: this is what you are likely to 
do when you have to wait at the doctor’s office and you forgot to 
bring anything to read. Another fairly common way of attending is 
(iii), where we are focusing on a specific property of a specific object: 
the performance of most perceptually guided actions presupposes 
attention of this kind (Hayhoe and Ballard, 2005). Finally, (iv), which 
seems much less common to me, is an experience where our attention 
is focused and distributed at the same time: it is focused inasmuch as 
we are attending to one object only. But it is distributed across the 
properties of this object. Our attention to properties is similar to the 
case of (ii) — it is not focused on one property only, but it is also very 
different from (ii) as this way of attending is always centred on one 
object only. And (iv) is clearly very different from (iii). If, as I argue, 
(iv) is a good bet for those who want to understand what disinterested 
attention is, (iii) would be the prime example of ‘interested attention’. 
And (ii) would be attending characterized by no interest at all. Dickie 
offered us a choice between (ii) and (iii) and (rightly) pointed out that 
neither should be taken to be aesthetic attention. But he failed to con-
sider other ways of attending. He failed to consider (iv), attending 
focused on an object but distributed across its properties. 
A quick note on what I take to be the ‘object of attention’ when I 
talk about attention focused on an object: by ‘object of attention’ I 
mean perceptual object (or, as it is sometimes labelled, ‘sensory indi-
vidual’; see Cohen, 2004; Nanay 2013). If one has an aesthetic experi-
ence of a landscape, then the ‘object of attention’ is likely to be the 
entire landscape and not one tree or another (one, of course, can have 
an aesthetic experience of a single tree as well). And in this case, the 
attention exercised in this experience is still focused with regards to its 
object, while distributed with regards to its properties (and among 
these properties will be relational properties connecting various parts 
of the landscape). 
This account of aesthetic attention is not vulnerable to Dickie-style 
objections: there is a very clearly defined difference between aesthetic 
attention and non-aesthetic attention — one of them is distributed 
across properties but focused on one object, whereas the other one is 
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not. But does this account capture the appeal to disinterestedness that 
drives the earlier accounts of aesthetic attention? Well, the answer 
depends on what one means by disinterestedness. Distributed attention 
is not strictly speaking disinterested if by ‘disinterest’ we mean the 
lack of interest, but I take this to be a good thing. It would be odd to 
suppose that what characterizes our aesthetic experience is the lack of 
interest. 
But thinking of aesthetic attention as distributed attention does 
capture the original Kantian importance of disinterest in our aesthetic 
experiences. Practical interest in an object, which is supposed to 
exclude aesthetic experience, could be described as attention focused 
on a limited number of its features — the ones we are interested in 
from a practical point of view. It is only when we are free from practi-
cal interests that we have a chance to experience the object in an 
aesthetic manner. This does not mean that we experience it with no 
interest — Dickie is right about this. Aesthetic attention does not 
equal the lack of attention. It equals distributed attention among a 
variety of properties, which is nonetheless focused on the same object. 
Thus, we can say that aesthetic interest is not really disinterest but 
rather distributed interest.8 
Here is an empirical reason to think that this account about aesthetic 
attention is on the right track. Attention, as we have seen, can be 
covert or overt. Overt shifts of attention are accompanied by eye-
movements. Covert shifts are not. So not all changes in attention are 
tracked by eye-movements. But many are. And it can be and has been 
analysed how the eye-movement patterns of experts and naïve 
observers differ when looking at artworks. The findings show that at 
least the overt attention of art experts (that is, artists and/or people 
with between 5 and 11 years of art school training) is much more 
distributed (spatially) than that of naïve observers (Vogt and 
Magnussen, 2007). When looking at a picture of a scene with a human 
figure, the eye-movements of naïve observers tend to be focused on 
                                                          
8  This account, like most of the disinterested attention accounts, is formulated in a way 
that seems to fit best with our experience of the visual arts: a tranquil contemplation of a 
picture or a sculpture. But given that there is nothing about distributed attention that is 
tied to the visual sense modality and to a stationary scene we are observing, my account 
can also give a good description of our aesthetic experience of the non-visual and 
temporal arts — music and film, for example (see, for example, Peacocke, 2009, for an 
account emphasizing the importance of attending to relational properties, which I take 
to be a form of attending in a distributed manner, for the appreciation of music). 
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the human figure (and especially the face), whereas the eye-
movements of experts tends to be distributed almost evenly across the 
image surface. I do not take these findings to be definite proof about 
the importance of aesthetic attention because I don’t think that art 
school training strongly correlates with one’s ability to have aesthetic 
experiences, and I also need to acknowledge that the distribution of 
attention these experiments are about is spatial distribution, whereas 
not all distribution with regards to properties is spatial distribution. 
But I do think that these experiments at least indicate that the account 
of aesthetic attention is on the right track. 
V. Aesthetic Attention and Aesthetic Experience 
My claim was that attending to a variety of properties of the object we 
are looking at, that is, aesthetic attention, is a central feature of some 
paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience — again, the claim is not 
that it is a necessary let alone sufficient condition for all different 
kinds of aesthetic experiences. No doubt, there are many experiences 
where our attention is distributed among a number of properties of the 
perceived scene that are in no way aesthetic experiences. And there 
are also experiences that people tend to describe as aesthetic but 
where our attention is not at all distributed. 
Here is a potential candidate for a type of experience where our 
attention is not distributed — in fact it is very much focused. Suppose 
that I am looking at Van Eyck’s Man in a blue turban (or blue 
chaperon) and I am mesmerized by the hue of the turban: that is the 
only aspect of the painting to which I am devoting all my attention. 
Do I have an aesthetic experience? Maybe I do, although one may 
wonder what this is an aesthetic experience of: clearly not of the paint-
ing or even of the turban — maybe of the hue. But even if it is an 
aesthetic experience, it is clearly not an aesthetic experience of the 
Proustian kind I have been focusing on. So, again, some experiences 
that may be called aesthetic may not require aesthetic attention. 
Nevertheless, those paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience I 
zeroed in on at the beginning of the paper do. But maybe I am too 
concessive. It could be argued that, when we are captivated by the 
colour of the turban, we may very well be distributing our attention 
among a number of properties. The turban has various shades and part 
of what the observer may describe as being mesmerized by the colour 
may in fact consist of attending to how the shade changes across the 
surface: how it is lighter on the left and slightly darker on the right, 
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how it is the lightest just above the forehead, etc. What the observer 
may describe as being mesmerized by the colour may also involve 
attending to the contrast between the blue of the turban and the dark 
brown of the man’s clothes, or the contrast between the blue of the 
turban and the much darker, almost black shade of the background. If 
so, however, then her attention is in fact distributed among a variety of 
different properties of the object her attention is focused on. 
More generally, one could argue that aesthetic experiences often 
have a lot to do with formal unity: the taking in of the artwork (or 
whatever is experienced in an aesthetic manner) as a single, integrated 
whole (see Beardsley, 1981, for a classic exposition of this). The 
worry then would be that this seems like focused and not distributed 
attention. But this way of thinking about aesthetic experiences is very 
much consistent with my approach. Remember that aesthetic attention 
is focused with regard to the object and distributed with regards to the 
properties. And this, I would agree, describes the features of aesthetic 
experiences Beardsley talks about: we do attend to the unified single 
integrated whole of the perceptual object: our attention is focused with 
regards to the perceptual object. But at the same time, our attention is 
distributed with regards to the properties of this perceptual object: the 
different aspects of this integrated whole and the different ways they 
contribute to its being an integrated whole. In order to appreciate the 
unity and integration of what we experience aesthetically, we need to 
exercise our attention in this focused (with regards to objects) and at 
the same time distributed (with regards to properties) manner: we need 
aesthetic attention. 
Conversely, suppose that you have an experience where your 
attention is distributed. Will this experience automatically count as an 
aesthetic experience? Clearly not. If you promise to give me a lot of 
money if I manage to have an experience where my attention is distri-
buted and I succeed, this will still be unlikely to count as an aesthetic 
experience. But then we may need to add a further condition: maybe 
that we shouldn’t value this experience for the sake of something else 
(which seems to be what goes wrong with this example, see Levinson, 
2013; Iseminger, 2006, for the importance of this ‘valuing for its own 
sake’ line of argument in understanding aesthetic experiences).9 
                                                          
9  This would also keep apart aesthetic experiences and other, more prosaic, experiences, 
such as that of unwrapping a gift. 
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Note that emphasizing the importance of aesthetic attention in 
thinking about aesthetic experiences captures some of the oldest plati-
tudes about the difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experi-
ences. When I look at a Giacometti sculpture while being attacked by 
a burglar and looking for a defence weapon, I am unlikely to have an 
aesthetic experience. But when looking at it in a museum, undis-
turbed, with a lot of time on my hands, admiring its composition, then 
I am in a better position to have an aesthetic experience. When the 
burglar is attacking me, my attention is focused on one property of my 
environment only: on how I can use the objects around me for 
defending myself. So I am likely to see the objects in my visual field 
as belonging to two categories: things that I can use to defend myself 
and things that I can’t. When I spot the Giacometti, I am very likely to 
take notice of one and only one of its numerous properties: its 
propensity to serve as a means of my self-defence (see Nanay, 2011; 
2012; 2013). If, in contrast, I am looking at the sculpture in a museum, 
with a lot of time on my hands, admiring its composition, then nothing 
should stop me from attending to a number of its properties: nothing 
should stop my attention from being distributed with regards to the 
properties of the sculpture. It needs to be added that nothing 
guarantees that my attention will in fact be distributed with regards to 
the properties of the object. I may, after all, be obsessed with the size 
of the feet of Giacometti’s figures and pay attention to only that one 
aspect of the sculpture. Or I may be looking for a sculpture that fits on 
my bookshelf and I am only interested in the size of the sculpture. In 
these cases, my attention is, again, focused on one property only — it 
is not an instance of aesthetic attention. 
The very fact that in my account whether our experience is aesthetic 
is not guaranteed by the situation and our intentions should, in itself, 
be taken to be an indication that the account is on the right track. As 
we have seen in Section II above, we do not have full control over 
whether we have an aesthetic experience. We go to a museum to have 
an aesthetic experience of an artwork we had an aesthetic experience 
of a day ago, but it is just not happening. We stand in front of it and, 
although we really want to, we fail to experience it in an aesthetic 
manner. Most of the existing explanations of aesthetic experience 
(notably, the deflationary account — Carroll 2000; 2002; 2006 — and 
those approaches that talk about ‘valuing for its own sake’ — 
Levinson, 2013; Iseminger, 2006) fail to account for this interesting 
and unfortunate aspect of aesthetic experiences (see Nanay, forth-
coming). If, however, aesthetic attention is indeed a central feature of 
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some paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience, then whether we 
manage to have an aesthetic experience is at least to a large part a 
matter of whether we manage to attend in this specific manner. And 
attending in a certain way is not something we can always force our-
selves to do (see Prinzmetal and Landau, 2008, for a good summary 
on this; arguably, this point was already made by Leibniz, 1704/1981, 
§54).10 
The same goes for the other desideratum for accounts of aesthetic 
experience: the one about the lingering effect of aesthetic experiences. 
If aesthetic experience is a matter of the exercise of aesthetic attention, 
then what we should expect is that our way of attending in a distri-
buted manner will be slow to change — because we do not have full 
control over the way we exercise our attention. But then, just because 
the movie or the concert is over or just because we left the museum, 
the way we exercise our attention does not have to, and often does not, 
change — it is the aesthetic way in which we are attending to the 
world that lingers. 
But does this way of thinking about aesthetic attention adequately 
describe what the grand novelists were trying to capture? I hope so. 
Here is Robert Musil’s characterization of aesthetic experience (what 
he calls the ‘Other Condition’), which appears to make the same 
connection between aesthetic experience and distributed attention: 
Everything was shifted out of the focus of attention and has lost its 
sharp outlines. Seen in this way, it was all a little scattered and blurred, 
and yet manifestly there were still other centres filling it again with 
delicate certainty and clarity. For all life’s problems and events took on 
an incomparable mildness, softness and serenity, and at the same time 
an utterly transformed meaning. (Musil, 1979, pp. 144–5) 
Some other old and influential descriptions of aesthetic experience 
also seem to support my emphasis on aesthetic attention. Take Roger 
Fry’s famous description of his aesthetic experience of watching a 
film (which is also one of the earliest pieces of theoretical writing on 
cinema): 
If, in a cinematograph, we see a runaway horse and cart, we do not have 
to think either of getting out of the way or heroically interposing our-
selves. The result is that in the first place we see the event much more 
                                                          
10  I do not claim that my account is the only possible account that is capable of accounting 
for the fact that aesthetic experiences are not fully under our control. But my account 
can explain this and the other accounts that are on offer have difficulties doing so. 
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clearly; see a number of quite interesting but irrelevant things, which in 
real life could not struggle into our consciousness, bent, as it would be, 
entirely upon the problem of our appropriate reaction. I remember 
seeing in a cinematograph the arrival of a train at a foreign station and 
the people descending from the carriages; there was no platform, and to 
my intense surprise I saw several people turn right round after reaching 
the ground, as though to orientate themselves; an almost ridiculous 
performance, which I had never noticed in all the many hundred 
occasions on which such a scene had passed before my eyes in real life. 
The fact being that at a station one is never really a spectator of events, 
but an actor engaged in the drama of luggage or prospective seats, and 
one actually sees only so much as may help to the appropriate action. 
(Fry, 1909/1920, pp. 18–9) 
Fry talks about irrelevant aspects of the perceived scene that, if the 
scene were observed in a non-aesthetic manner, would have gone 
unnoticed. In other words, we are attending to aspects of the perceived 
scene we would not be attending to otherwise. Our attention is 
aesthetic attention. D.H. Lawrence gives a surprisingly similar 
characterization of the way attention is exercised when we engage 
with art: ‘The essential quality of poetry is that it makes a new effort 
of attention, and “discovers” a new world within the known world’ 
(Lawrence, 1928/2005, p. 107). 
A much more detailed and more influential description of aesthetic 
experience comes from the Russian formalists. One of the key con-
cepts of Russian formalism is defamiliarization (see Thompson, 1988, 
pp. 10–11). Here is what this concept means: 
If we start to examine the general laws of perception, we see that as 
perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic… Such habituation 
explains the principles by which, in ordinary speech, we leave phrases 
unfinished and words half expressed… The object, perceived in the 
manner of prose perception, fades and does not leave even a first 
impression; ultimately even the essence of what it was is forgotten… 
Habitualization devours work, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the 
fear of war… And Art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; 
it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose 
of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived, and not 
as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar’, 
to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of per-
ception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself 
and must be prolonged. (Shklovsky, 1917/1965, pp. 11–12) 
This metaphor could also be interpreted easily in the framework I 
outlined above. If an object is unfamiliar, we do not know how to 
approach it, therefore we tend to attend to a number of its properties to 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
13
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  AESTHETIC  ATTENTION 115 
figure out what to do with it or what can be done with it. If an object is 
familiar, we just attend to those of its properties that we need to attend 
to. When the Russian formalists describe aesthetic experience as being 
similar to the experience of the unfamiliar, they really describe a way 
of attending to this object that is less focused than it normally would 
be. They describe what I call aesthetic attention. 
Similar considerations apply in the case of the following famous 
quote by Giorgio de Chirico: 
One clear autumnal afternoon I was sitting on a bench in the middle of 
the Piazza Santa Croce in Florence. It was of course not the first time I 
had seen this square… The whole world, down to the marble of the 
buildings and the fountains, seemed to me to be convalescent. In the 
middle of the square rises a statue of Dante draped in a long cloak, 
holding his works clasped against his body, his laurel-crowned head 
bent thoughtfully earthward. The statue is in white marble, but time has 
given it a gray cast, very agreeable to the eye. The autumn sun, warm 
and unloving, lit the statue and the church façade. Then I had the 
strange impression that I was looking at all these things for the first 
time. (De Chirico, 1912, cited in Chipp, 1968, pp. 397–8) 
De Chirico seems to suggest that what is distinctive about aesthetic 
experience is that it is an experience that is very much akin to 
encountering something for the very first time. As encountering some-
thing for the very first time seems to imply some version of distributed 
attention (as we have no precedent to go by for approaching the object 
visually), these views seem to be consistent with the general line of 
argument I am proposing here. 
This may also help us to give an answer to one of the most 
important questions about aesthetic experience, namely, why should 
we care? Why do we pay large sums of money to put ourselves in a 
position to have an aesthetic experience (which, as we have seen, 
doesn’t always then materialize)? If we accept my claim about the 
centrality of aesthetic attention in understanding aesthetic experience, 
the answer will be straightforward: because aesthetic experiences 
allow us to see and attend to the world differently — in a way that we 
don’t, and couldn’t, see it otherwise. 
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